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Purpose - This study analyses the relationship between countries’ regulatory context and 
voluntary carbon disclosures. To date, little attention has been paid to how specific 
climate change-related regulation influences companies’ climate change disclosures, 
especially voluntary carbon reporting.   
Design/methodology/approach – The New Institutional Sociology perspective has been 
adopted in order to examine the pressure of a country’s climate change regulation on 
voluntary carbon reporting. This research uses Tobit regression to analyse data from 
2,183 companies in 12 countries that were invited to respond to the CDP questionnaire in 
2015.  
Findings - The results show that countries’ specific climate change-related regulation 
does influence both the participation of its companies in the CDP, and their quality, as 
measured by the CDP disclosure score.  
Research limitations – The sample is restricted to 12 countries’ regulatory environment. 
Thus, caution should be exercised when generalizing the results to other institutional 
contexts.  
Practical implications – The results are of use to regulators and policymakers to better 
understand how specific climate change-related regulation influences voluntary carbon 
disclosure. Investors may also benefit from this research as it shows which institutional 
contexts present greater regulatory stringency, and how companies in more stringent 
environments take advantage of synergy to disclose high-quality carbon information. 
Social implications – By linking regulatory and voluntary reporting, this study sheds 
light on how companies use voluntary carbon reporting to adapt to social expectations 
generated in their institutional context. 
Originality/value – This is the first research that considers specific climate change-





1. Introduction    
Climate change has led to an increase in concern over companies’ levels of Greenhouse 
Gas emissions (hereinafter GHGs), and their contribution to global warming (Hahn et al., 
2015). As a result, companies find themselves under pressure from different stakeholders 
to report on their strategies for climate change, as well as on the risks and opportunities 
it entails (Freedman and Jaggi, 2010), so that said stakeholders may incorporate this 
information into their decision-making process (Luo et al., 2013). 
Many countries exert pressure on companies by establishing regulations that require them 
to measure and reduce their GHG emissions (Depoers et al., 2016). In this sense, the 
Kyoto Protocol represented an important step forward since it established emissions 
reduction targets for the majority of industrialised countries (UN, 2018). Indeed, the 
Kyoto Protocol has been used in several previous studies to measure the influence of a 
country’s regulatory context on companies’ carbon reporting. However, no consistent 
results have been obtained: while certain authors have detected a positive relationship 
between the two (e.g. Freedman and Jaggi, 2005; Jira and Toffel, 2013; Prado et al., 
2009), others have not been able to find a significant relationship (e.g. Brouhle and 
Harrington, 2010; Luo et al., 2012). In recent times, many countries have increased their 
environmental regulations in order to respond to the challenges of climate change, and 
they have passed specific laws for the reduction of GHG emissions (Nachmany et al., 
2015). This evolution towards greater specificity in climate change regulations together 
with the inconsistency of the results obtained in the previous literature have prompted the 
writing of this paper. In this sense, this research analyses the pressure exerted by a 
country’s regulatory context on companies’ carbon reporting strategies, taking into 
account whether they do or do not disclose information as well as the quality of the 
information disclosed. 
In order to generate greater visibility to their emissions reductions targets and strategies, 
companies have fundamentally used two types of carbon reporting: mandatory and 
voluntary reporting (Borie, 2015). In terms of the latter, the Carbon Disclosure Project 
(hereinafter CDP) has become the main global standard for carbon disclosure. The CDP 
is an organisation founded by 35 institutional investors, and aims to provide support for 
better informed decision-making (Stanny and Ely, 2008). On an annual basis, the CDP 
sends a voluntary questionnaire to companies around the world, and then gathers and 
evaluates corporate data on emissions reduction targets and strategies, and awards scores 
accordingly. Furthermore, the CDP’s annual reports, by country and by region, also 
include those companies that did not respond, declined to participate, or who did not make 
their response public (CDP, 2017). 
Data from CDP reports has primarily been used in previous research to analyse the factors 
that may influence the voluntary carbon reporting (e.g. Ben-Amar and McIlkenny, 2014; 
Giannarakis et al., 2017; Luo et al., 2012; Luo et al., 2013; Reid and Toffel, 2009), under 
different theoretical perspectives (Hahn et al., 2015).  
The New Institutional Sociology (hereinafter NIS) theory has been used in order to 
analyse the pressure of a country’s climate change regulation on companies’ response to 
demands for carbon disclosure. The theoretical perspective of NIS allows the institutional 
context within which it is developed to be introduced into the analysis of carbon reporting 
(González and Zamora, 2016a; Perrault and Clark, 2010). Following this theory, the 
decision to disclose or not to disclose carbon information, and how to disclose it, is not 
necessarily the result of a rational decision-making process on the part of organizations 
that act independently (Larrinaga, 2010), but rather it may be conditioned by pressures of 
the institutional context of the country common to them (Grauel and Gotthardt, 2016), 
including regulatory pressures. Along these lines, Scott (2014) pointed out that 
organizations are deeply immersed in institutional contexts, which at the same time both 
facilitate and restrict said organizations’ behaviour.  
In line with these arguments, climate change regulations would imply the existence of a 
context that exerts higher levels of pressure on companies to take action and disclose 
information about themselves. Similarly, companies may choose to participate in 
voluntary carbon reporting in preparation for future regulatory changes (Luo et al., 2012) 
which could also damage their legitimacy. Hence, this paper assumes that a country’s 
regulatory context is positively associated with voluntary carbon reporting on the part of 
companies. Along with the pressure exerted by the regulatory context, this paper also 
considers other control variables, which are representative of the social and financial 
market pressures that influence companies’ behaviour. 
More specifically, this paper analyses whether a country’s regulatory context influences 
companies’ decisions on voluntary carbon reporting, and if it influences the quality of 
companies’ responses to the CDP questionnaire. For this purpose, data was analysed from 
2,183 companies, in 12 countries, who had been invited to respond to the CDP 
questionnaire in 2015. In contrast to previous research which relied on Logit models to 
study environmental information disclosure (Luo et al., 2012, 2013; Reid and Toffel, 
2009; Stanny and Ely, 2008), this paper uses the Tobit regression, since it allows both 
participation in the CDP questionnaire and the score obtained to be evaluated. 
This paper contributes to the literature on voluntary carbon reporting in several ways. 
Firstly, it examines the pressure exerted by the regulatory context through specific climate 
change-related variables, in contrast to previous studies which consider general 
environmental regulation  (e.g. Luo et al., 2012; Rankin et al., 2011; Reid and Toffel, 
2009). Secondly, it takes into account the influence of regulatory pressure on all the 
companies included in the CDP 2015 report for each country or region, thus avoiding the 
bias of many previous studies which only considered the largest companies in the world 
as listed on principal indices (Borghei and Leung, 2013; González and Zamora, 2016b). 
In this respect, the majority of such studies are based on samples from Global 500 
companies (e.g. Freedman and Jaggi, 2005; Luo et al., 2012; Prado et al., 2009; Tang and 
Luo, 2011), or concentrate on listed companies in a specific country (e.g. Brouhle and 
Harrington, 2010; Eleftheriadis and Anagnostopoulou, 2015), and do not consider the 
effect of the regulatory context on companies not included in said indices. Thirdly, given 
that the previous literature has not provided consistent results regarding the influence of 
a country’s regulatory context on companies’ decisions to participate in voluntary carbon 
reporting, this study’s larger sample size – in terms of both companies and countries – 
may contribute to an increase in the consistency of the relationship between the factors 
under consideration. 
The results show that the specific climate change regulation of a country does influence 
both the participation of its companies in the CDP questionnaire, and the quality of the 
information disclosed. Additionally, size and financial risk are positively and 
significantly related to climate change disclosure. These results have implications for 
regulators and policymakers in that they will be better able to understand how specific 
climate change-related regulation affects corporate carbon disclosure. Furthermore, the 
findings of this study are informative for investors as they show which institutional 
contexts present greater regulatory stringency, and how companies in more stringent 
environments take the advantage of synergy to voluntarily disclose high-quality carbon 
information. This paper provides a better understanding of the determinants that motivate 
firms’ participation in voluntary carbon reporting, as well as the factors that affect the 
quality of the information disclosed.    
The paper is structured as follows. The second section presents the theoretical framework 
and the factors that may influence voluntary carbon reporting. The third section details 
the methodology used, while the fourth section presents the descriptive analysis, the 
empirical results and the robustness analysis. Finally, the fifth section includes the main 
conclusions, as well as the possible implications for future research. 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development  
According to Hahn et al. (2015), three main groups of theories can be identified to explain 
the voluntary disclosure of GHG emissions on the part of companies: socio-political 
theories of disclosure; economic theories of disclosure; and institutional theory. Within 
the group of socio-political theories, stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory (Clarkson 
et al., 2008) may be highlighted. The first of these argues that companies are subject to 
pressure from different stakeholders (e.g. suppliers, customers, investors, governments, 
etc.), all of whom may have different expectations and interests (Freeman, 1984); 
company managers may respond to this pressure and manage their relationships with 
stakeholders through voluntary carbon reporting. With regard to legitimacy theory, this 
maintains that companies operate in society based on a social contract (Guthrie and 
Parker, 1989; Patten, 1992), whereby they agree to carry out socially desirable actions in 
exchange for the approval of their actions and objectives (Brown and Deegan, 1998; 
Giannarakis et al., 2017). In this way, companies are able to use the CDP questionnaire 
as a reporting vehicle, in order to increase their legitimacy and avoid social scrutiny 
(Stanny, 2013). Several studies have used socio-political theories to explain the factors 
that influence carbon reporting (e.g. Freedman and Jaggi, 2005; Luo et al., 2012, 2013; 
Prado et al., 2009), and all agree that company size has a positive influence on the 
decision to voluntarily disclose environmental information. This result is consistent with 
the argument of socio-political theories, which uphold that larger companies are subject 
to greater social scrutiny, hence they will be more likely to voluntarily disclose 
environmental information.   
For their part, economic theories of disclosure (Verrecchia, 1983) suggest that 
companies’ carbon reporting is based on a cost-benefit analysis. Hence, companies will 
voluntarily disclose environmental information if the cost of doing so is lower than the 
positive consequences generated by doing so (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). This 
group of theories includes the voluntary disclosure theory, which predicts the positive 
impact of voluntarily disclosed information on financial performance (Verrecchia, 1983). 
According to this theory, companies that dedicate resources to improving their 
environmental performance are interested in having investors know about this 
information so they may in turn assess the former’s behaviour. These companies, 
therefore, will be more likely to disclose a greater amount of environmental information, 
thereby also making it more difficult for less well-performing companies to simulate their 
behaviour (Clarkson et al., 2008; Freedman and Jaggi, 2010).  
Signalling theory, which also falls within the group of economic theories of disclosure, 
maintains that companies that control their emissions are able to achieve a competitive 
advantage, but that they also bear higher costs (Dawkins and Fraas, 2011; Denicolò, 
2008). These companies would signal their decisions to the government by means of 
voluntary information disclosure. The underlying idea is that the regulator will see that 
the current cost of complying with regulation is low, thereby leading to stricter levels of 
regulation which competitors are less able to comply with but which are attainable by 
those companies that do voluntarily disclose information (Brouhle and Harrington, 2010; 
Luo, 2017).  
Finally, institutional theory argues that companies base their decisions for voluntary 
carbon reporting not only on economic aspects, but also because they are forced to so by 
pressure from the institutional context (Bansal and Roth, 2000; Hahn et al., 2015). 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) identified isomorphism as the process by which an 
organization tends to resemble others in its same context. Consequently, organizations 
that share a particular institutional context are subject to the same institutional pressures, 
thus facilitating isomorphism. There are three isomorphic processes which make 
organizations so similar to each other: coercive, normative and mimetic. Specifically, 
coercive isomorphism results from both formal and informal pressures exerted on certain 
organizations that they depend on, as well as from shared expectations within the society 
in which the organizations operate. Similarly, Boxenbaum & Jonsson (2008) viewed 
these three isomorphic processes as topographical directions from which they emerged 
within an organizational field. They stated that while regulatory pressures stem from 
institutions that are in a higher position, such as governments, normative and mimetic 
pressures come from peer organizations that are positioned at the same level.  
Although normative and mimetic pressures may be important factors influencing 
voluntary carbon reporting, this paper is focused on coercive isomorphism for the 
following reasons: (1) it has been extensively considered in the literature on voluntary 
carbon reporting, although it has concentrated on general environmental regulation 
(Freedman and Jaggi, 2010; Jira and Toffel, 2013; Luo et al., 2012; Prado et al., 2009) 
and thus has not taken into account the specific problem of climate change-related 
regulation; (2) the coercive dimension exerts a more obvious and direct pressure on 
organizations in general (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 2014), and on their 
environmental behaviour in particular (Bebbington and Larrinaga, 2008; Qian and Burritt, 
2008), thereby facilitating its measurement; and (3) an important aspect of coercive 
isomorphism is that it is the authority and capacity to sanction on the part of the actor on 
which organizations depend that exerts the pressure (Scott, 2014), with the state being the 
main actor in this case, as considered in this paper.  
 
More specifically, this paper focuses on the specific state-centric view of the regulatory 
dimension, that is regulation that occurs through legal instruments promulgated by the 
government. This study adopts the state-centric approach because: (1) the crucial role of 
the state in promoting coercive isomorphism through this type of regulation has been 
predominantly considered in the NIS literature (Scott, 2014); (2) the legal instruments 
promulgated by the state offer a common legal environment for organizations (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983) which operate in a particular country, which is aligned with the 
objective of this paper; (3) governmental support has played a key role in promoting 
climate change-related regulation (Nachmany et al., 2015); (4) the second commitment 
period of the Kyoto Protocol is currently in force, which is based on more centralized 
regulation (UNFCCC, 2019); and (5) many countries worldwide are now improving and 
expanding mandatory reporting requirements so as to incorporate more stringent 
disclosures on social and environmental information (Nachmany et al., 2015; Noronha et 
al., 2013).  
According to the NIS perspective, it is regulatory pressure in particular – among all other 
institutional pressures – that displays the greatest coercive power, since it is based on laws 
and regulations that must be complied with; on the overseeing of compliance on the part 
of companies; and on the imposition of sanctions in the case of non-compliance 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 2014). Thus, institutions’ regulatory context creates 
a legal framework in order to influence organizations’ behaviour, e.g. companies within 
certain sectors are required to disclose their carbon emissions as consequence of 
implementing an emissions trading scheme. However, according to the arguments of the 
institutional pillars (Järvenpää, 2009; Scott, 2014), climate change regulation generates 
social expectations that may affect the performance of both companies subject to 
regulation, and those that are not. Apart from the requirements of the regulatory 
framework, adapting to these social expectations can lead companies to voluntarily 
disclose carbon information through a widely accepted mechanism such as the CDP. In 
this regard, NIS predicts that the higher the number of adopters of a particular practice, 
the wider the social acceptance and the greater the legitimacy that it contributes 
(Deephouse and Suchman, 2008). 
In accordance with NIS, organizational legitimacy is a key consequence of institutional 
isomorphism (Deephouse, 1996). Therefore, organizations that adapt to the pressures 
exerted by the regulatory pillar of their country’s institutional context obtain legitimacy, 
understood as the degree of cultural support received by an organization (Meyer and 
Scott, 1992). Legitimacy is a key concept in the NIS perspective, although its 
consideration is different from that stated by legitimacy theory. While the latter focuses 
on the concept of legitimacy as the ability of organizations to alter the perceptions of 
other actors (e.g. regulators or public opinion), NIS focuses on the organizations’ 
compliance with the institutions in their environment, which reflect external expectations 
concerning what behaviours are acceptable (Deegan, 2002). In this regard, Scott (2014) 
highlighted the fact that organizational legitimacy derives from the organizations’ 
conformity with institutions.  
Larrinaga (2010) argued that while legitimacy theory is useful for determining in the short 
term why an organization is disclosing environmental information, NIS is useful for 
explaining why certain sustainability reporting practices become common within a 
particular context. Perrault and Clark (2010) pointed out that the environmental and social 
reporting carried out by companies to respond to coercive regulatory pressures entails 
several drawbacks. In particular, they indicated that it usually leads to an increase in the 
amount of information disclosed, but not in the quality of the information. Furthermore, 
the information is used to justify the company’s behaviour socially for the sole purpose 
of recovering legitimacy. They thus concluded that more mandatory information may not 
be necessary as it is already provided voluntarily. Although voluntary reporting also 
receives criticism, Perrault and Clark (2010), concluded that it is showing more promise 
in terms of changing undesirable corporate behaviour.  
The previous literature also offers several reasons as to why companies may choose to 
voluntarily disclose environmental information, especially carbon information, such as: 
to obtain legitimacy; to improve the company’s reputation; to attract investment funds; to 
adapt to future regulatory changes; and to take advantage of synergies with existing 
environmental information systems (Deegan, 2002; Grauel and Gotthardt, 2016; 
Larrinaga, 2010; Ott et al., 2017; Perrault and Clark, 2010). From the NIS perspective, 
voluntary carbon reporting via the CDP is a vehicle for companies (both subject and not 
subject to mandatory carbon reporting) to adapt to the social expectations of their 
environment. These expectations encompass what society expects from companies. Thus, 
companies tend to incorporate these expectations into their operations, and furthermore, 
over time, expectations tend to become moral obligations (Järvenpää, 2009). Companies’ 
adaptation to social expectations allows them to obtain legitimacy from both regulatory 
bodies (legally authorised bodies that have authority over organizations), and public 
opinion (which has the role of establishing the norms of social acceptability) (Deephouse, 
1996). Moreover, in the case of the CDP, this initiative was launched by institutional 
investors, who themselves are actors that can provide financial resources, and above all, 
they occupy a position that allows companies to confer legitimacy (Deephouse, 1996).  
It is possible to identify countries’ regulatory context as the laws and norms that they 
have established in relation to climate change. Thus, the role of governments is 
fundamental given their capacity to establish laws and regulations, thereby incentivizing  
companies to reduce their GHG (Stoddart et al., 2012). Townshend et al. (2013) pointed 
out that national climate change-related regulation is of vital importance for 
implementing international agreements, as well as for increasing confidence for future 
international commitments given that experience at the national level may increase the 
likelihood of attaining international pledges.  
Many governments use a carbon pricing instrument to internalize the external costs of 
carbon emissions, as well as to reduce GHG emissions to the atmosphere (Metcalf and 
Weisbach, 2009). Two main mechanisms can be used to set a price on carbon emissions: 
carbon tax and the GHG emissions trading scheme (hereinafter ETS). With regard to 
carbon tax instruments, governments place an explicit price on carbon emissions by 
establishing a tax rate, i.e. a price per tonne of CO2 emitted, as well as by specifying those 
companies or industries subject to said tax (Haites, 2018). In this sense, targeted subjects 
can choose between reducing their emissions or paying for them. Therefore, the GHG 
emission reduction depends on the decision taken by the targeted subjects. An ETS 
instrument sets a limit on carbon emissions by selected subjects, and issues allowances in 
quantities approximately equal to the limit. Emission rights are tradable, and their price 
is determined by supply and demand (Chevallier, 2013). ETS differs from carbon tax in 
that the carbon price of emissions is not predefined whereas the GHG emission reduction 
outcome is (World Bank, 2018). 
Apart from implementing carbon pricing instruments, governments can require 
mandatory reporting of companies’ GHG emissions. For instance, the Australian 
government promulgated the National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting (hereinafter 
NGER) Act in 2008, which requires the reporting of GHG emissions on the part of 
specific organizations. This was a challenge for many companies, since they had to be 
mandatorily accountable for their GHG emissions. Thus, the promulgation of the NGER 
Act led to the emergence of many accounting implications for both organizations and the 
government. In this sense, the NGER Act facilitates carbon reporting and GHG emissions 
assurance; it provides engagement with stakeholders; it offers a tool with which to 
manage risks arising from climate change; it facilitates the implementation of carbon 
management accounting; it makes available data about GHG emissions; and is extremely 
useful for developing a carbon pricing mechanism (Lodhia, 2011). Four years later, 
Australia implemented a system which put a price on carbon emissions, but it was 
abolished in 2015 (Jotzo and Mazouz, 2015). In this study’s sample, all the countries 
possess a climate change regulatory framework. However, it is difficult to measure the 
level of seriousness of a given country based solely on the number of laws related to 
climate change disclosures, since while some rules are broad and integrative, others are 
very narrow in scope (Townshend et al., 2013). 
With specific regard to carbon emissions, institutional theory establishes that companies 
opt for voluntary carbon reporting in order to better position themselves vis-à-vis future 
regulatory changes (Luo et al., 2012), thus avoiding possible sanctions and adapting to 
their institutional context (Scott, 2014). In order to measure the regulatory pressure 
exerted by different countries, the previous literature has utilised the signing of the Kyoto 
Protocol. While certain studies have found a positive and significant relationship between 
carbon reporting and companies belonging to a country that has ratified the Kyoto 
Protocol  (e.g. Freedman and Jaggi, 2005 y 2010; Jira and Toffel, 2013; Prado et al., 
2009), others have not detected a significant relationship between these two factors (Luo 
et al., 2012), which means, therefore, that the results obtained in the previous literature 
are not consistent. 
Studies that consider other specific GHG regulations such as the ETS, or specific 
regulations for some of the more polluting sectors, do not achieve consistent results either 
(Brouhle and Harrington, 2010; Kim and Lyon, 2011; Luo et al., 2012; Rankin et al., 
2011; Reid and Toffel, 2009; Scholtens and Kleinsmann, 2011). Thus, for example, for a 
sample of Global 500 companies, Luo et al. (2012) found a positive and significant 
relationship between a company’s carbon reporting and their belonging to a country that 
had established an ETS. However, Rankin et al. (2011) concluded that companies’ 
participation in the European Union ETS had no impact on the decision of said companies 
as to the disclosure of their GHG emissions. 
Given the inconsistency of the results obtained in the previous literature, this paper studies 
the influence of different countries’ regulatory institutional context on voluntary carbon 
reporting, using variables which are representative of policies and regulations specifically 
related to the fight against climate change. Furthermore, unlike previous studies (e.g. 
Freedman and Jaggi, 2005; Luo, 2017), which are based on larger companies or on listed 
companies in a specific country (e.g. Brouhle and Harrington, 2010; Eleftheriadis and 
Anagnostopoulou, 2015), this study considers the influence of different countries’ 
regulatory environment on all of the companies that appear in CDP climate reports for 
each country/region. 
Although response to the CDP questionnaire is on a wholly voluntary basis, it may be 
expected that companies which belong to countries with established specific climate 
change regulations will adapt and make investments to control and reduce their GHG 
emissions, with the aim of avoiding possible sanctions or loss of legitimacy (Cho and 
Patten, 2007). This in turn could result in increased participation in the CDP along with 
an improvement in the score obtained by companies in those countries. Therefore, the 
following hypotheses are proposed: 
H1. The regulatory context of a country positively and significantly influences the 
participation of companies in said country in the CDP questionnaire. 
H2. The regulatory context of a country positively and significantly influences the level 
of disclosure of companies in said country that have responded to the CDP questionnaire. 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Sample 
The initial sample was based on 2,905 companies included in the 2015 CDP reports from 
those countries for which we possess data regarding their regulatory context (Australia, 
Canada, France, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States of America). Subsequently, 580 companies 
identified as belonging to the financial sector were eliminated from the sample, as 
recommended by Luo et al. (2012). Similarly, the following were also eliminated: 8 
companies duplicated in the CDP reports; 21 S.A. companies (due to their being a 
subsidiary or having merged during the CDP report submission process), as 
recommended by Luo et al. (2012); and a further 113 companies whose financial data 
was not available in Datastream. Thus, the final sample includes 2,183 companies from 
12 countries that operate in different sectors (GICS). 
3.2  Sources 
Data from the dependent variable (CDP) was manually extracted from the 2015 CDP 
reports, which are available on the organisation’s website. In the case of Indonesia, data 
for companies that did not respond, declined to participate, or that did not publish the 
questionnaire was collected from the CDP web database, since the CDP climate report 
for Hong Kong and South East Asia edition only included companies that did respond to 
the questionnaire. The 2015 CDP questionnaire consists of several modules: Introduction; 
Corporate Governance; Risks and Opportunities; Accounting and Verification of GHG 
Emissions; Energy Use; and Emissions Trading (CDP, 2015). Similarly, CDP reports 
have a standard format that facilitates comparison between companies and sectors (Luo 
et al., 2012). Several investigations related to carbon disclosure have used data from the 
CDP (e.g. Kolk et al., 2008; Luo et al., 2012; Reid and Toffel, 2009; Stanny and Ely, 
2008). 
The Environmental Policy Stringency Index (EPSI) prepared by the OECD (Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development), which measures the stringency of every 
country’s specific environmental policy primarily related to climate and air pollution 
(OECD, 2017), has been used as an approximation for measuring regulatory pressure. 
The data was obtained from the OECD database, as available on its website. 
Meanwhile, the financial data necessary for the calculation of the control variables was 
extracted from the Datastream database. In line with Stanny (2013) and Luo et al. (2012), 
financial data from the end of fiscal year 2014 was used given that the CDP questions 
companies on carbon data for the preceding year. Thus, the 2015 CDP report contains 
emissions data related to the period from 1st January to 31st December 2014. 
3.3 Theoretical model 
The decision of companies to voluntarily participate in carbon reporting is a function that 
includes several pressures [1]: 
𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 =  𝑓(𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒,
𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒)  [1] 
The econometric model used is as follows [2]: 
𝐶𝐷𝑃 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 +  𝛽2𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 +  
𝛽5𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 +  𝛽6𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐼 + 𝛽7𝐸𝑇𝑆 +  𝛽8−16𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 + 
𝛽17−28𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 +  𝜀   [2] 
The following control variables were introduced into the model: size, beta, TobinQ, 
leverage and profitability. These variables have been widely contrasted in previous 
studies and have demonstrated a high level of explanatory power with regard to voluntary 
carbon reporting. Following on from the abovementioned model, the EPSI and ETS 
variables were included as representative of the influence of different countries’ 
regulatory context, with the aim of testing this study’s target hypothesis. In addition, 
dummy variables for each sector (GICS) and country were created in order to control the 
fixed effects of each. 
Regression was estimated using the Tobit model, since the dependent variable has a 
restricted range of values (the score received by the companies that responded to the 2015 
CDP questionnaire ranged in value from 0 to 100). Tobit model regressions were 
estimated according to maximum likelihood, since the use of linear models was not 
appropriate in this case because the coefficients would have been biased and inconsistent 
(Wooldridge, 2015). The Tobit regression has been used in previous studies to analyse 
factors that influence companies’ carbon reporting  (e.g. Clarkson et al., 2008; Cormier 
et al., 2005; González and Zamora, 2016b).  
3.4 Variables 
Table 1 summarises the variables introduced in the model.  
[Insert here Table 1] 
The dependent variable (CDP) reflects the companies’ 2015 CDP disclosure score. The 
CDP disclosure score measures the quality, comprehensiveness and completeness of the 
companies’ response to the questionnaire. In addition, it reflects the companies’ internal 
management, carbon strategies and corporate transparency with respect to climate 
change. Therefore, firms with high levels of transparency regarding their climate change-
related strategies will have a higher CDP disclosure score than those companies with 
lower levels of transparency (Lemma et al., 2019). Responding companies must follow 
the CDP guidelines when reporting climate change information to the CDP, e.g. managers 
cannot modify the structure of the CDP questionnaire. Thus, CDP carbon information can 
be compared across companies, countries and sectors, since the information provided is 
consistent for all participating companies (Luo et al., 2012, 2018). In line with these 
arguments, several previous studies support the use of the CDP disclosure score to 
measure companies’ participation in the CDP, as well as the quality of their response 
(Cotter & Najah, 2012; Lemma et al., 2019; Tang & Luo, 2016). In fact, apart from being 
of interest in recent empirical studies, the CDP disclosure score has high levels of 
credibility for sustainability experts (Luo, 2017). The dependent variable (CDP) is equal 
to the score obtained in the CDP questionnaire if the company in question answered the 
questionnaire and published the score. On the contrary, i.e. in the case of a company that 
did not respond to the questionnaire, declined to participate, or did not publish the 
questionnaire, the dependent variable CDP takes a value of zero. 
EPSI. This variable approximates the regulatory pressure of countries. As mentioned 
above, this index is prepared by the OECD and measures the stringency of each country’s 
specific environmental policy, thus allowing for comparison among them. In this way, it 
evaluates and incorporates a series of environmental policy instruments, primarily related 
to climate and air pollution (Botta and Koźluk, 2014). More specifically, stringency 
should be understood as the degree to which environmental policies place an explicit or 
implicit price on pollution or behaviour that is damaging to the environment (OECD, 
2017). EPSI adopts a range of values from 0 (not stringent) to 6 (highest degree of 
stringency). 
ETS. The implementation of an ETS involves the creation of a regulatory framework for 
carbon accounting, trading, reporting and assurance. Thus, the presence of an ETS 
provides strong evidence that a country is on a path to a low-carbon economy (Luo, 2017). 
Companies belonging to a country that has implemented an ETS are under pressure to 
measure, trade, report and verify their carbon emissions. Therefore, these companies are 
better positioned to participate in the CDP questionnaire and to disclose higher quality 
information on GHG emissions than companies headquartered in a country that does not 
possess an ETS. They can also benefit from synergy, since they are subject to greater 
carbon regulatory stringency in their country. Previous studies have considered the 
establishment of an ETS to analyse voluntary carbon disclosures (Luo, 2017; Luo et al., 
2012; Tang and Luo, 2016). They highlighted the fact that companies headquartered in 
countries that have implemented an ETS are more likely to voluntarily disclose their 
carbon emissions. Thus, this study predicts that firms in countries with an ETS are more 
likely to respond to the CDP questionnaire and disclose high-quality information.  
Previous studies have found that social and financial markets pressures influence 
voluntary carbon disclosures, so this study includes five variables (size, beta, TobinQ, 
leverage and profitability) to control those pressures. Hahn et al. (2015) pointed out that 
it is difficult to compare the results of control variables in previous research, since they 
include different sets of control variables in their models. Therefore, this study addresses 
this issue by considering a set of control variables that are commonly used in studies on 
voluntary carbon disclosure, which it may be helpful for future comparisons.  
Size. Legitimacy theory argues that larger companies are subject to greater social 
pressure. Thus said companies will be willing to participate in higher levels of carbon 
reporting in order to demonstrate their compliance with social expectations and to prevent 
their legitimacy from being threatened (Cho and Patten, 2007; Solomon and Lewis, 
2002). Size has been used as a control variable in several previous studies related to 
environmental disclosure (Cormier et al., 2005; Liu and Anbumozhi, 2009; Martínez et 
al., 2015; Matisoff 2013), and they all agree that there is a positive and significant 
relationship between size and carbon reporting. It is therefore expected that company size 
will have a positive effect, both on the participation of companies in the CDP as well as 
on the score they obtain. The natural logarithm of total revenues is used to measure 
company size (Cotter and Najah, 2012; Matisoff, 2013). 
Beta. The previous literature confirms that there is a positive and significant relationship 
between a company’s volatility or risk and environmental information disclosure 
(Cormier et al., 2005). According to stakeholder theory, companies with a higher level of 
business risk are more likely to participate in carbon reporting in order to allow investors 
to evaluate this information more accurately (Tang and Luo, 2011). Previous research has 
used this variable as an approximation of companies' business risk (Cormier et al., 2005; 
Tang and Luo, 2011). Luo et al. (2012) included companies’ Beta in their model as a 
control variable. The Beta used in this study is based on 23 to 35 consecutive end-of-
month price percentage changes, and their relativity to the local market index. 
TobinQ. This variable is used as an approximation of companies' future growth 
expectations (Luo et al., 2012). Companies with a higher TobinQ will be more likely to 
disclose more information in order to reduce information asymmetries. Thus, investors 
will better able to calculate the market value of these companies and their intangible assets 
(Stanny and Ely, 2008). The previous literature does not establish a conclusive 
relationship between environmental disclosure and TobinQ. Many studies do not find a 
significant relationship between both variables (González and Zamora, 2016b; Luo et al., 
2012; Tang and Luo, 2011; Wegener et al., 2013). In this study, TobinQ was calculated 
as the sum of the company's market value plus preferred shares plus the book value of 
long-term debt and current liabilities, divided by the book value of the total assets 
(Clarkson et al., 2008). TobinQ is expected to have a positive and significant influence 
on voluntary carbon reporting (Tang and Luo, 2011). 
Leverage. Companies with higher levels of leverage will be subject to greater pressure 
from investors and creditors. Hence these firms will be willing to participate in carbon 
reporting in order to respond to the demands of the aforementioned stakeholders and to 
improve their financial flexibility (Stanny and Ely, 2008). With regard to the influence of 
leverage on environmental disclosure, empirical studies have not achieved consistent 
results. Some authors have not found a significant relationship between companies’ 
leverage and their level of environmental disclosure (e.g. Freedman and Jaggi, 2005; 
Prado et al., 2009; Stanny and Ely, 2008). Andrikopoulos and Kriklani (2013) analysed 
the environmental disclosures of companies listed on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange 
and found a negative relationship between the level of leverage of these companies and 
their disclosure. On the contrary, Clarkson et al. (2008) observed a positive and 
significant relationship between leverage and environmental disclosure. Following 
Freedman and Jaggi (2005), we assume that leverage will positively and significantly 
influence response to the CDP questionnaire and the score obtained. This study uses the 
total debt to total assets ratio to measure the companies’ leverage (Borghei and Leung, 
2013). 
Profitability. The previous literature on voluntary disclosure argues that the financial 
performance of companies may influence environmental disclosure. In this way,  
profitable companies may be better positioned to address the costs associated with 
reducing carbon emissions (Bewley and Li, 2000). However, for the most part, empirical 
studies do not demonstrate a conclusive relationship between company profitability and 
carbon reporting (Chu et al. , 2012; Luo et al., 2013; Rankin et al., 2011). In this study, 
it is assumed that company profitability will positively and significantly influence 
voluntary carbon reporting (Luo et al., 2013). ROA (Return on Assets), as measured as 
earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets (Penman, 2007; Subramanyam 
and Wild, 2009), is used as an approximation of company profitability. 
4. Empirical results 
This section presents a breakdown of the regulatory context and companies by country, 
as well as a summary of firms by sector. This section also details the descriptive analyses, 
the empirical results and the robustness tests. 
4.1 Overview of climate change-related regulation by country  
It is worth noting that the majority of countries in the sample have some type of carbon 
pricing system to reduce GHG emissions (see Table 2). ETS is the predominant carbon 
pricing instrument used in these countries. Conversely, no carbon pricing instrument had 
been officially implemented in Australia, India, Indonesia, South Africa and Turkey in 
2015 (Kossoy et al., 2015). However, South Africa and Turkey are considering 
introducing a system to set a price on GHG emissions in the future (Alton et al., 2014; 
Kossoy et al., 2015). In the United States, some carbon pricing initiatives do exist to 
reduce GHG emissions at the state level (e.g. California cap-and-trade scheme and The 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI)). Similarly, in some provinces of Canada 
(e.g. British Columbia, Alberta and Quebec) certain instruments existed in 2015 that put 
an explicit price on carbon emissions (carbon tax in British Columbia; ETS in Alberta 
and Quebec) (Kossoy et al., 2015). While many countries are implementing carbon 
pricing instruments and struggling to mitigate GHG emissions through them, Australia 
abolished the carbon pricing mechanism it established in 2012 (World Bank, 2018). 
European Union countries (France, Italy and the United Kingdom in the sample) 
implemented a cap-and-trade system in 2005 called the European Union Emission 
Trading Scheme (hereinafter EU ETS). As well as implementing the EU ETS, France and 
the United Kingdom established a carbon tax in 2014 and 2013 respectively (Kossoy et 
al., 2015). By establishing a carbon tax, these countries internalize the external costs of 
those companies that are not covered by the EU ETS.  
4.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 provides an overview of the EPSI index, carbon pricing instruments and firms by 
selected countries. Of the 2,183 companies, Japanese companies make up the largest 
group, followed by companies from the United States and the United Kingdom. Together 
they account for more than 45 per cent of the sample. On the contrary, countries with less 
representation in the sample are Italy (3.16 per cent), South Africa (2.84 per cent) and 
Indonesia (1.83 per cent). 
[Insert here Table 2] 
It can be seen from the data in Table 2 that the countries with the highest regulatory 
stringency are the United Kingdom, France, Canada and Italy. They all have an EPSI 
index greater than 3.2 points. These countries have a carbon pricing instrument in place 
at the national or subnational level (Kossoy et al., 2015). Similarly, these countries have 
a higher percentage of companies that respond to and make the CDP questionnaire public, 
with an average score greater than 80 points. In average terms, countries with stringent 
climate change-related regulation have a greater number of companies disclosing carbon 
information to the CDP. In addition, companies headquartered in these countries have, on 
average, a better CDP score, which means that they are disclosing high-quality 
information regarding their carbon emissions. It is of note that certain countries such as 
India, Indonesia, South Africa and Turkey, where there is no carbon pricing implemented, 
have less than 2 points in the EPSI index.  
South Korean, South African and Indian companies have an average CDP score greater 
than 90. Interestingly, although South Africa and India have a low EPSI index, these 
countries have the second and the third highest average CDP score in the sample (94.60 
and 93.07 respectively). In these countries, climate change-related regulation has been 
improved and expanded over the last decade (Nachmany et al., 2015; Never, 2012). 
Furthermore, from 2015 onwards, the majority of them have been considering the 
implementation of a carbon pricing mechanism in the future (Kossoy et al., 2015), which 
in turn may imply a change in the level of mandatory disclosure. For instance, in 2015 
South Africa was considering the introduction of a carbon pricing mechanism (Alton et 
al., 2014; Vorster et al., 2011). Therefore, companies in this country may be voluntarily 
providing high quality information to the CDP in order to adapt to future changes in 
climate change regulation, thus avoiding possible penalties and conforming to their 
institutional context (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 2014). Also, South Korea 
implemented its national cap-and-trade system in 2015 (Kossoy et al., 2015). Thus South 
Korean companies may be disclosing high quality carbon information to the CDP to 
conform to the new regulation of trading of GHG emissions allowances.  
Table 3 shows the breakdown of firms by sector. Consumer discretionary, Industrials and 
Materials are the largest group in the 2015 CDP report. Utilities companies have the 
highest average CDP score (93.02). Such companies (e.g. electric utilities) are under 
higher regulatory pressures that force them to control and report their carbon emissions 
(Kolk et al., 2008). Thus, these companies take advantage of the synergy to participate in 
voluntary carbon reporting, such as the CDP. Telecommunication companies have the 
highest response rate, followed by Information Technology and Material companies.  
[Insert here Table 3] 
Table 4 contains the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum for each of the 
variables, taking into consideration all of the companies in the sample. In order to perform 
a comparative analysis between those companies that do have a CDP score and those that 
do not, the descriptive statistics were broken down according to companies that responded 
to the CDP questionnaire (Table 5) and those that did not respond, declined to participate, 
or did not publish the CDP questionnaire (Table 6). 
 [Insert here Table 4] 
[Insert here Table 5] 
[Insert here Table 6] 
The sample is composed of 2,183 companies, of which 1,094 participated in the 2015 
CDP questionnaire, while 1,089 did not respond, declined to participate, or did not publish 
their response. As can be seen in Table 5, the average score of the companies that 
answered the CDP questionnaire is rather high (86.75). After comparing the descriptive 
statistics of Tables 5 and 6, it can be seen that those companies that did respond to the 
questionnaire are, on average, of greater size and possess higher levels of risk, leverage 
and profitability as compared to those companies that did not respond, declined to 
participate, or did not publish the 2015 CDP questionnaire. Furthermore, those companies 
that did respond and did publish the CDP questionnaire belong to countries that have an 
Environmental Policy Stringency Index (EPSI), which is slightly higher than the average 
of the companies included in the sample. It should be emphasised that the maximum value 
in the stringency index of the countries included in the sample is 3.83, which is quite far 
below the maximum degree of stringency (6). 
Table 7 shows Pearson and Spearman’s correlation coefficients. As it may be seen, there 
are no high or significant correlations between pairs of independent variables that could 
imply multicollinearity problems.  
[Insert here Table 7] 
4.3 Multivariate analysis 
Table 8 displays the results of the Tobit regression. The first two columns show the 
variables under examination and the signs expected for each of them. The following 
column shows the coefficients of the Tobit regression for each of the independent 
variables. The Tobit regression coefficients in particular should not be interpreted as if 
they were linear regression estimates. Hence they must be broken down in order to assess 
the magnitude of the regressor in each of the two effects: on the one hand, the effect on 
the score obtained by the companies that did respond to and publish the CDP 
questionnaire; on the other, the effect on the probability of participation in the 
questionnaire on those companies that did not respond, declined to participate, or did not 
publish the questionnaire. The marginal effects for each of the independent variables are 
presented in the last two columns of Table 8. 
 [Insert here Table 8] 
The EPSI variable, herein used as an approximation of the pressure of countries’ 
regulatory context, shows a positive and significant relationship at the maximum level 
with the dependent variable (CDP). After controlling for other influences, this result 
supports both Hypothesis 1 and 2, i.e. that firms in countries with high levels of climate 
change-related regulatory stringency are more likely to voluntarily disclose their GHG 
emissions through the CDP, as well as tending to provide better quality carbon 
information. That is to say, countries’ climate change-related regulatory context 
encourages firms to voluntarily adopt a proactive carbon disclosure strategy. In contrast, 
companies in countries characterized by lower levels of climate change-related regulatory 
stringency are less likely to participate in voluntary carbon disclosures. The EPSI variable 
has an impact of 3.5 points on the score of the CDP, along with a 5 per cent increase in 
the probability of responding for each unit increase in the value of this variable. This 
finding is consistent with the argument that companies belonging to countries with strict 
regulations specifically related to climate change will be more likely to participate in 
voluntary carbon reporting. 
In addition, a positive and significant association was found between voluntary carbon 
disclosures and the presence of an ETS. Consistent with prior studies (e.g. Luo et al., 
2012, 2018), this research found that the implementation of an ETS influences 
companies’ participation in voluntary carbon disclosure practices. The implementation of 
an ETS creates a regulatory framework that pressures firms to measure, trade, report and 
verify their GHG emissions. Therefore, consistent with the NIS perspective, companies 
in an ETS country are able to take advantage of synergy with existing environmental 
information systems in order to participate in voluntary carbon disclosures, as well as to 
disclose high quality information.  
Climate change-related regulation forms part of the regulatory pillar in countries which 
establish mandatory rules that can oblige liable companies to mandatorily disclose their 
carbon emissions. By providing carbon information, companies comply with the 
regulation and will both avoid sanctions and enhance their future survival (Scott, 2014). 
However, the climate change-related regulation also generates social expectations that 
may condition the behaviour of companies both subject to regulation and, those that are 
not. Adaptation to these social expectations (which constitute what society expects 
companies to do as considered to be correct) can condition companies to carry out carbon 
reporting on a voluntary basis through the CDP. Thus, by sharing the same institutional 
context, companies will share the social rules and expectations of their context, adapt to 
them and ultimately present isomorphic behaviour in relation to carbon disclosures. 
Regarding the control variables, the estimated coefficients for a company’s size are 
positive and significant at the p = 0.01 level, which suggests that larger companies are 
more likely to participate in voluntary carbon disclosures. Large firms tend to disclose 
more carbon information due to pressures from both stakeholders (Freeman, 1984; Luo 
et al., 2018) and society in general (Patten, 2002). The influence of size on carbon 
reporting has been widely investigated in previous research (e.g. Cormier et al., 2005; 
Liu and Anbumozhi, 2009; Martínez et al., 2015; Matisoff 2013), where it is shown to be 
a relevant variable, as is the case with our model. Financial risk, as measured by 
companies’ Beta, also presents a high incidence rate on environmental disclosures. Beta 
presents a positive and significant coefficient at 99 per cent, coinciding with the argument 
that companies with higher financial risk will provide stakeholders with greater levels of 
carbon disclosure (Luo et al., 2012). Conversely, coefficients for TobinQ, leverage and 
profitability are not significant. 
  
4.4 Robustness tests 
There are many instances of climate change-related regulation in the 12 countries covered 
by this study (Nachmany et al., 2015). As this paper discussed previously, the number of 
climate change-related laws that a country has enacted is not a perfect measure of its 
response to climate change. However, this same number of laws may be a good measure 
of the seriousness of the country towards climate change (Townshend et al., 2013). 
Therefore, this study formulates an additional Tobit model in which the ETS variable is 
replaced by a variable taken from the study by  Nachmany et al., (2015), which classifies 
countries according to the number of climate change-related laws they have. This study 
runs a regression which considers the combination between the EPSI index and the 
number of climate change laws that a country has enacted. In this way, this model takes 
into account the countries’ climate change-related regulatory body as much as their level 
of stringency. Table 9 presents the result of the Tobit model.  
[Insert here Table 9] 
The results obtained were similar to those presented in Table 8. The significance and the 
signs of the variables are similar to those shown in model 1 of Table 8. Similarly, the 
coefficients do not present significant value variations. These results serve to reinforce 
the findings of this study, and to confirm the relationship between countries’ regulatory 
context and voluntary carbon reporting on the part of companies headquartered in those 
countries. In addition, the data was analysed using ordinary least squares regression. The 
results (not tabulated) are qualitatively similar and do not change the inferences of the 
study.  
5. Conclusions 
The main objective of this paper was to analyse the influence of different countries’ 
regulatory context on both the decision of companies in said countries to participate in 
carbon reporting through the CDP questionnaire, and on the score they obtained. Given 
its focus on the influence of the regulatory environment on organisational behaviour, this 
paper has relied on New Institutional Sociology in order to analyse the pressure exerted 
by the specific climate change regulation in 12 different countries on the response of 
companies to the demands of carbon reporting. This research has used the Tobit 
regression to analyse the data collected and to study the effects on the score obtained in 
the CDP, as well as the effects on the probability of responding to the questionnaire in 
the case of those companies that did not respond, declined to respond or did not publish 
the CDP questionnaire. 
After controlling for social and financial pressures, the results obtained show that the 
probability of companies’ participating in voluntary carbon reporting, along with the 
quality of the response – as measured by the score obtained in the CDP questionnaire – 
are explained by countries’ climate change-related regulatory context. More specifically, 
the results show that countries’ regulatory environment has a positive and significant 
influence, both in terms of the probability of participating in the CDP questionnaire and 
of the score obtained, whereby both hypotheses H1 and H2 are confirmed. Hence, 
companies that belong to countries with higher levels of stringency as regards climate 
change regulation (with a higher score in the EPSI index), will be more likely to 
participate in voluntary carbon reporting. The presence of an ETS also positively and 
significantly influences voluntary carbon disclosure through the CDP questionnaire.  
With respect to the control variables introduced into the model, both company size and 
risk do positively and significantly affect voluntary carbon reporting through the CDP, 
which is consistent with the results found in previous research (Clarkson et al., 2008; 
González and Zamora, 2016b; Luo et al., 2012). The results also show that leverage, 
profitability and TobinQ have no statistically significant influence on voluntary carbon 
disclosure.  
This study provides empirical evidence that the regulatory dimension of institutions offers 
explanations for the impact of specific climate change-related regulations on voluntary 
carbon disclosures (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott, 2014). 
It also provides a complementary explanation of how companies manage their legitimacy 
and adapt to social expectations through voluntary carbon disclosures. To date, papers 
that have examined the influence of the regulatory context on carbon reporting, 
considered environmental or sustainability regulations which, although they may contain 
some reference to climate change, are rather generalist in nature. However, this study 
considers the influence of specific climate change-related regulation which, apart from 
imposing binding rules on target companies, also generates greater visibility for the 
problem of climate change in society, thus contributing to the creation of social 
expectations with regard to the appropriate corporate behaviour required. This research 
reinforces this argument, and implies that increased stringency in levels of climate change 
regulation can generate social expectations more focused on companies’ behaviour 
related to climate change, thus facilitating evaluation and scrutiny by different agents or 
stakeholders. This has an influence on companies’ behaviour, since they tend to adapt to 
social expectations, as evidenced by their greater participation in voluntary carbon 
disclosures, as well as by the high quality of information disclosed. 
The results of this research suggest that a combination of voluntary and mandatory 
mechanisms for reporting carbon information are required in order to urge firms to 
disclose better quality information in terms of their carbon footprint. In this way, they can 
help policymakers to make informed decisions regarding specific climate change 
regulation, as well as to implement or improve the design of carbon pricing systems. 
Moreover, these results are helpful for stakeholders, as they need to incorporate climate-
related regulatory risks into their economic decisions. For their part, company managers 
can use the CDP questionnaire to reveal to society the actions they are undertaking in 
order to mitigate climate change-related risks, thus demonstrating how they are adapting 
to the pressures of their country’s regulatory context. 
As this paper shows, climate change-related regulations generate social expectations that 
affect the disclosure behaviour of companies both subject to regulation and those that are 
not. Therefore, adaptation to these social expectations (Scott, 2014) influences firms to 
carry out voluntary carbon disclosure. And by articulating a more specific set of 
regulative rules for addressing the climate challenge, regulators and policymakers may 
thus create the conditions that promote the adoption of voluntary carbon disclosure on the 
part of companies. The findings of this paper are also informative for both investors and 
regulators, since they show how companies are adapting to their regulatory environment, 
as well as how companies in more stringent environments take advantage of synergy to 
disclose high-quality carbon information.  
This paper contributes to the literature concerning the determinants that motivate 
voluntary corporate carbon disclosure, particularly through the CDP (Luo et al., 2012; 
Stanny, 2013). Previous studies on this matter have considered different factors such as 
finance (e.g. profitability, leverage, capital spending), ecology (e.g. carbon emissions, 
carbon-intensive industry), the regulatory context (e.g. stringency of environmental 
regulations, ETS, common-law countries), as well as disclosure-related determinants (e.g. 
companies’ CDP participation, corporate environmental and sustainability reports) 
(Clarkson et al., 2008; Cotter and Najah, 2012; Jira and Toffel, 2013; Luo et al., 2012; 
Prado et al., 2009; Rankin et al., 2011; Reid and Toffel, 2009; Stanny, 2013). However, 
the papers that studied the influence of the regulatory context on voluntary carbon 
reporting considered environmental regulations that are rather generalist in nature (e.g. 
Luo et al., 2012; Rankin et al., 2011; Reid and Toffel, 2009). Thus the use of specific 
climate change regulation has not been investigated. This paper fills this gap by 
examining the influence of regulatory pressures on voluntary carbon disclosure while 
taking into account more specific measures within the regulatory context related to 
climate change. This is important because many countries worldwide are now improving 
and expanding specific regulations in order to address the climate challenge (Nachmany 
et al., 2015). In this sense, it considers the influence of specific climate change-related 
regulation as opposed to previous research which considers generic environmental or 
sustainability regulations (e.g. Luo et al., 2012; Rankin et al., 2011; Reid and Toffel, 
2009). Therefore, this paper contributes to the previous literature in several ways: it 
provides specific measurements of countries’ regulatory pressures related to climate 
change; it connects voluntary carbon reporting with the institutional context in which it 
takes place (González and Zamora, 2016a) and it links the national institutional context 
and its mandatory regulation with the voluntary decision of companies in this context to 
disclose carbon information (Grauel and Gotthardt, 2016). Furthermore, this study took 
into consideration all the companies that appear in the 2015 CDP reports by 
country/region, thus avoiding the bias found in many previous studies which only 
consider larger-scale companies or those listed in the main indices of specific countries 
(e.g. Freedman and Jaggi, 2005; Luo et al., 2012; Prado et al., 2009; Tang and Luo, 2011). 
Although this research goes beyond typical studies regarding the determinants of 
corporate carbon disclosure, there may still be scope for a broader consideration of 
isomorphic pressures. As it stands, this paper focuses on coercive isomorphism, more 
specifically on formal coercive pressures from state-imposed regulations related to 
climate change. Thus further research is required into other forms of regulation, e.g. 
“decentered regulation” (Black, 2008). Furthermore, there are other institutional 
pressures that may also affect companies’ participation in voluntary carbon disclosure; 
the influence of normative and mimetic pressures on voluntary carbon reporting in 
particular remains unexplored. In relation to normative pressures, companies may adopt 
voluntary initiatives such as the TFCD (Task Force on Climate-Related Financial 
Disclosures) guidelines (TCFD, 2019) not because they are imposed by regulations, but 
rather because they believe it is morally the right thing to do (Scott, 2014). Hence further 
research could explore how normative pressures may affect voluntary corporate carbon 
disclosure. With regard to mimetic pressures, further research could investigate whether 
shared cultural conceptions regarding climate change do influence firms’ disclosure 
behaviour. It is expected that companies in countries with high levels of climate change 
awareness will be more likely to voluntarily disclose carbon information, thus leading to 
greater participation in the CDP. However, as Larrinaga (2010) points out, one of the 
main drawbacks of mimetic pressures is their measurement. In addition, given that 
institutional pressures are not presented in isolation and that, in many cases, it is difficult 
to separate them even under empirical scenarios (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 
2014), further research could examine the interplay of different isomorphic pressures 
(coercive, normative and mimetic) in creating the conditions for the adoption of voluntary 
carbon disclosure practices.  
Even though a large number of companies were available for this research, it was only 
possible to consider companies from 12 different countries, hence the findings cannot be 
generalised to other institutional contexts. In this sense, future research may consider 
applying this analysis to companies across a greater number of countries, which would 
allow the consistency of the results to be increased. Likewise, in line with other studies 
(Zamora et al., 2016), it would be of interest to analyse the influence of different 
countries’ regulatory context on carbon reporting and its value relevance for the market. 
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Dependent variable  
CDP 0 if company no response/decline to participate/non-public CDP 
questionnaire (NR/DP/NP). CDP score, otherwise. 
 
Independent variables  
 Description References Predicted 
sign 
EPSI Index that measures the stringency of 
each country’s specific environmental 
policy. It has a range of values from 0 
(not stringent) to 6 (highest degree of 
stringency). 
(Botta & Koźluk, 2014) + 
 
ETS Dummy variable, taking value 1 if the 
firm belongs to a country that has an 
established emissions trading scheme, 
and 0 otherwise. 




Control variables  
Size Natural logarithm of total revenues. (Cotter & Najah, 2012; 
Matisoff, 2013) 
+ 
Beta Beta is a measure of systematic risk of 
the firms. In this study, it is based on 23 
to 35 consecutive end-of-month price 
percentage changes, and their relativity 
to the local market index. 
(González & Zamora, 
2016b; Luo et al., 2012; 
Tang & Luo, 2011) 
+ 
TobinQ Proxy of TobinQ, calculated as the 
market capitalization of the company 
plus preferred shares, book value of 
long-term debt, and current liabilities, 
divided by book value of total assets at 
the end of fiscal year 2014. 
(Clarkson et al., 2008; 
González & Zamora, 
2016b; Luo et al., 2012) 
+ 
Leverage Total debt divided by total assets at the 
end of fiscal year 2014. 
(Borghei & Leung, 2012; 
González & Zamora, 
2016b; Luo et al., 2012; 
Stanny & Ely, 2008) 
+ 
Profitability Return on assets. Calculated by 
earnings before interest and taxes 
divided by total assets at the end of 
fiscal year 2014. 
(Penman, 2007; 
Subramanyam & Wild, 
2009) 
+ 













N % N % 
Australia 3.17 0 179 116 64.80 63 35.20 81.48 
Canada 3.28 1 134 55 41.04 79 58.96 84.56 
France 3.58 1 210 133 63.33 77 36.67 86.73 
India 1.82 0 142 112 78.87 30 21.13 93.07 
Indonesia 1.08 0 40 36 90.00 4 10.00 53.00 
Italy 3.28 1 69 33 47.83 36 52.17 86.00 
Japan 3.17 1 397 191 48.11 206 51.89 89.23 
South Africa 0.71 0* 62 10 16.13 52 83.87 94.60 
South Korea 3.07 1 207 162 78.26 45 21.74 94.62 
Turkey 1.92 0* 89 62 69.66 27 30.34 77.89 
United Kingdom 3.83 1 261 56 21.46 205 78.54 84.49 
United States 2.69 1 393 123 31.30 270 68.70 86.42 
Total   2,183 1,089 49.89 1,094 50.11 86.75 
Table 2. Distribution of regulatory context and companies by countries. CPI = Carbon Pricing 
Instrument; 1 = countries with a CPI in place at the national or subnational level; * = the country 
is considering the introduction of a CPI in the future; 0 = countries where there is no CPI in place. 
NR/DP/NP = no response/decline to participate/non-public CDP questionnaire. R = responding 
companies. The percentage is determined by dividing the number of companies by the total firms 
in the country. The average score is calculated using the total score of responding companies 





















NR/DP/NP R Average 
score N % N % 
Consumer Discretionary 473 272 57.51 201 42.49 84.51 
Consumer Staples 202 95 47.03 107 52.97 92.15 
Energy 180 104 57.78 76 42.22 85.95 
Healthcare 184 117 63.59 67 36.41 84.40 
Industrials 446 201 45.07 245 54.93 85.29 
Information Technology 233 94 40.34 139 59.66 85.71 
Materials 306 132 43.14 174 56.86 87.61 
Telecommunication 48 16 33.33 32 66.67 90.25 
Utilities 111 58 52.25 53 47.75 93.02 
Total 2,183 1,089 49.89 1,094 50.11 86.75 
Table 3. Distribution of firms by sector. NR/DP/NP = no response/decline to participate/non-
public CDP questionnaire. R = responding companies. The percentage is determined by dividing 
the number of companies by the total firms in the sector. The average score is calculated using 





















 Variables Obs Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
CDP 2,183 43.475 45.190 0 100 
Size 2,183 15.005 1.6777 8.123 20.288 
Beta 2,183 0.923 0.464 -0.264 4.419 
TobinQ 2,183 1.990 2.404 0.140 57.753 
Leverage 2,183 0.240 0.179 0 1.594 
ROA 2,183 0.081 0.141 -2.724 3.161 
EPSI 2,183 2.956 0.707 0.71 3.83 
ETS 2,183 0.584 0.494 0 1 
























 Variables Obs Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
CDP 1,094 86.752 17.861 3 100 
Size 1,094 15.655 1.570 9.852 20.288 
Beta 1,094 0.970 0.473 -0.209 4.4198 
TobinQ 1,094 1.863 2.650 0.140 57.753 
Leverage 1,094 0.252 0.159 0 1.272 
ROA 1,094 0.086 0.130 -0.861 3.161 
EPSI 1,094 3.019 0.722 0.71 3.83 
ETS 1,094 0.651 0.477 0 1 
























 Variables Obs Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
CDP 1,089 0 0 0 0 
Size 1,089 14.353 1.523 8.123 18.972 
Beta 1,089 0.875 0.450 -0.264 3.917 
TobinQ 1,089 2.118 2.124 0.221 21.699 
Leverage 1,089 0.229 0.198 0 1.594 
ROA 1,089 0.076 0.151 -2.724 0.910 
EPSI 1,089 2.892 0.686 0.71 3.83 
ETS 1,089 0.516 0.499 0 1 
Table 6. Descriptive statistics: companies that did not respond, declined to participate, or did not 

























Variable CDP Size Beta TobinQ Leverage ROA EPSI ETS 
CDP 1 0.495*** 0.120*** -0.039* 0.119*** 0.001 0.072*** 0.114*** 
Size 0.417*** 1 0.227*** -0.131*** 0.253*** -0.015 -0.120*** 0.139*** 
Beta 0.106*** 0.142*** 1 -0.086*** 0.047** -0.062*** -0.165*** -0.073*** 
TobinQ -0.062*** -0.131*** -0.046** 1 -0.187*** 0.624*** -0.143*** 0.060*** 
Leverage 0.076*** 0.193*** 0.065*** -0.115*** 1 -0.255*** -0.050** 0.096*** 
ROA 0.021 0.149*** -0.083*** 0.445*** -0.210*** 1 -0.193*** 0.015 
EPSI 0.072*** 0.002 -0.059*** -0.172*** -0.040 -0.110*** 1 0.349*** 
ETS 0.123*** 0.139*** -0.039* -0.028 0.079*** 0.036* 0.453*** 1 
Table 7. Correlation matrix. Spearman (above diagonal). Pearson (below diagonal). *Correlation is 















































Marginal effects on 
observable variable, 
given uncensored 
Marginal effects on 
probability of being 
uncensored 
Size + 20.254***(18.77) 8.203***(19.48) 0.111***(18.70) 
Beta + 10.144***(2.73) 4.108***(2.74) 0.056***(2.73) 
TobinQ + 0.247(0.28) 0.101(0.28) 0.001(0.28) 
Leverage + -4.619(-0.45) -1.870(-0.45) -0.025(-0.45) 
ROA + -0.380(-0.02) -0.154(-0.02) -0.002(-0.02) 
EPSI + 8.652***(3.11) 3.504***(3.12) 0.048***(3.11) 
ETS + 7.742***(1.97) 3.135***(1.97) 0.043***(1.97) 
Control of 
sector effects  




Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  -323.452***(-17.13)   
Total 
observations  
2,183 2,183 2,183 
Left censored 
observations  





LR Chi2  71.317***   
Pseudo R2   0.0326     
Table 8. Tobit regression. *** = significant p < 0.01, ** = significant p < 0.05, * = significant p < 0.10. 
Coefficients of the Tobit regression are estimated by maximum likelihood method. t-values (Tobit 





















Marginal effects on 
observable variable, 
given uncensored 
Marginal effects on 
probability of being 
uncensored 
Size + 20.877***(19.43) 8.457***(20.24) 0.115***(19.37) 
Beta + 12.015***(3.22) 4.867***(3.22) 0.066***(3.22) 
TobinQ + 0.145(0.16) 0.059(0.16) 0.001(0.16) 
Leverage + -3.594(-0.35) -1.456(-0.35) -0.020(-0.35) 
ROA + -2.995(-0.17) -1.213(-0.17) -0.017(-0.17) 
EPSI + 5.478***(1.99) 2.219***(1.99) 0.030***(1.99) 
Climate laws + 1.502***(4.52) 0.608***(4.52) 0.013***(4.52) 
Control of 
sector effects  




Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  -336.906***(-18.19)   
Total 
observations  
2,183 2,183 2,183 
Left censored 
observations  





LR Chi2  70.981***   
Pseudo R2   0.0337     
Table 9. Robust analysis. *** = significant p < 0.01, ** = significant p < 0.05, * = significant p < 0.10. 
Coefficients of the Tobit regression are estimated by maximum likelihood method. t-values (Tobit 
regression coefficients) and z-statistics (marginal effects) are reported in parentheses.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
